Getting More Out Of The Western And Central Pacific Tuna Convention

Current Problems And Future Dilemmas

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Outline

• What is the WCPO Fisheries Convention?
• Common-pool resource management tools
• The WCPO Fisheries Convention as a common-pool resource tool
• CPR rules
WCPO Fisheries Convention: a framework agreement

• Adopts broad aims for cooperative management

• Suggests some tools for achieving aims
  - E.g. Article 10: TAC/TAE; Limits on fishing capacity/vessel numbers; Gear controls; Fish size controls

• Offers little substance to measures
WCPO Fisheries Convention: debate over approach

- A coordinating mechanism between EEZ and high seas?
- A comprehensive management regime across all zones and all activities?

OR

- A common-pool resource management tool?
What is a common-pool resource?

- difficult to enforce exclusion
- Resource units subtractable

Difficult and expensive to organise and enforce resource management rules
Success factors in a CPR

Coordination rules governing:

• What are resource users allowed to do?

• How much resource can be used?

• Who can use the resource? and

• Sharing of the costs and benefits of resource use - to ensure compliance (pay-off rules)
Ignoring CPR dynamics drives overfishing

Regional Treaties (US Treaty, Palau Arrangement and FSM Arrangement)

Created incentives to over fish

EEZ/High Seas Divide
Lessons for the WCPO Fisheries Convention

Focus on developing rules designed for a CPR

- What is allowed? By whom? How much?
- Everyone needs to be better off following rules than not

For participation: change ‘payoff’ rules so that the costs and benefits of stock conservation are more equitably shared by PICs AND DWFN
Rule Combinations

Who is given access?

Costs and benefits shared?

What activities?

How much to use?

Scientific Advice
Options for Rule Combinations

• **What should be allowed?**
  - Gear restrictions

• **How much?**
  - Total allowable catch limits - link to economic scarcity
  - Links economic costs of fishing to harvest and biomass issues

• **Who should be given access?**
  - Security of use rights extended to DWFN and PIC fleets

• **Sharing of Costs and benefits**
  - Use TAC for wealth-redistribution
  - Use TAC allocation for encouraging self-compliance
Allocation Design: principles

- Equitable distribution of financial costs of harvest reduction

- Individual countries are rewarded for maintaining or going beyond agreements and punished for cheating

Considered in tandem with other CPR rules
Rights to DWFN?

- **DWFN input is legitimate in high seas management**
- **Membership of DWFN to the Fisheries Commission**
  - Decision by consensus
- **Ensuring DWFN bear some of the costs**
  - Costs of stock conservation
  - Costs of management tasks including monitoring and enforcement
Conclusion

- Economic institutions drive tuna fisheries problems

- Needs collective management of tuna stocks as a common-pool resource:
  - Activity rules, access rules, total resource use and sharing of costs and benefits